[1] This work is devoted to the analysis of the state and tendencies of the development of electoral research in modern Russian political science. It also includes a detailed examination of selected works in related sciences written within the framework of other disciplines. Its focus is restricted to the analysis of academic studies directed towards the scientific community. However, it also includes some considerations of a scientific nature devoted to the analysis of election quality and tailored to address a broader audience. At the same time, the work of Russian political scientists, which includes conducting electoral campaigns, as well as numerous applied studies orientated to identifying election expectations of voters and/or forecasting election results lie beyond scope of this text. These restraints can be explained as follows: The first type of work has the same connection with political science as the work of a DJ with musicology 1 (Note1: For analysis of some aspects of this work see Wilson A. Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005; Ledeneva A. How Russia Really Works. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, ch.2.), and the second type of work, as a rule, does not target the increase of new scientific knowledge. The main task of this work is to answer the question “what have Russian electoral researchers achieved studying elections in Russia and what kind of scientific results can we expect from them in the foreseeable future?” Since the institutional history dealing with the initial stage of electoral research in Russia (to 1997) was presented in the previous publication 2 (Note2: Gel’man V. Izuchenie vyborov v Rossii: issledovatel’skie napravleniya i metody analiza // Politicheskaya nauka, 2000, N3, pp.16-50 http://www.auditorium.ru/books/1162/full1162.pdf), the main attention here is focused on informative aspects of this branch of knowledge.
[2] The social sciences in Russia as a whole and political science in particular, are based epistemologically on three pillars. With few exceptions they are (1) atheoretical, (2) standard orientated and (3) not included into the comparative perspective. In simple terms, the majority of Russian researchers (1) consider the theory not as an instrument of cognition, but as some postulates accepted (or not) in good faith; (2) they usually reduce the empirical knowledge of reality to comparing of observed events with standard ideals („how it should be“), and (3) they consider Russia as a unique subject of research that does not fit comfortably into the analytical framework worked out from the material of other countries. As a matter of fact, it is a recurrence of the famous thesis „It is impossible to understand Russia with one’s mind“. In this regard, the establishment of electoral research in post-Soviet Russia shows a different cognitive perspective which is to an increasing degree positive, empirical and comparative. The positive side of the analysis here confronts the standard seeing of the world, the empirical one – the undiscriminating borrowing of foreign theories (along with the uncritical development of their own theories); and the comparative one - the non-scientific ideas of the unique “special Russian way” or, to the contrary, the universality of objective laws. In other words, the trajectory of evolving electoral research of the last decade in Russia can be specified as a step-by-step rejection of demands to establish “home-bred theories” (term of V. Radaev) 3 (Note3: See Radaev V. Est’ li shans sozdat’ natsional’nuyu teoriyu v sotsial’nykh naukakh // Pro et Contra, 2000, vol.5, N3, pp.202-214.) and a slow but systematic integration into the main stream of international political science. This can be seen not only on the basis of theoretical approach and methods of analysis developed in the West, but also by the fact, that in particular, Western and/or domestic (but not “home-bred”) examples of scientific knowledge establish the whole system of coordinates in this field of research.
[3] To prove this theory one can easily compare the contexts of the discussions that took place among Russian electoral researchers in the middle of the 1990s and a decade later. The main topic of the debate in the 1990s were the 1993 reform of the Russian electoral system, the role of electoral institution in the establishment of a new political regime in the country and problems of forecasting election results of the elections held between 1993 and 1996. As a rule, these discussions were, apart from the emotional state and political engagement of many participants, atheoretical and standard; 4 (Note4: See Gel’man V. Izuchenie vyborov v Rossii.) the comparative analysis of Russian electoral policy was by and large of ad hoc nature and as an empirical validation of conclusions, was first of all only the interpretation of a single observation. It is no wonder that when confronted with the complexity of studying new political events, researchers proclaimed that “Russian reality requires different theories” 5 (Note5: Andryushchenko E., А. Dmitriev, Zh. Toshchenko. Oprosy i vybory 1995 goda // Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, 1996, N6, p.13.). Apparently, in search of these „different theories“ that are allegedly necessary for studying Russian reality, one of the leading academic magazines published, in all seriousness, a comparative study of the horoscopes of the candidates for the State Duma elections. 6 (Note6: See Vasil’ev I. i dr. Kto borolsya za mesto v Dume // Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, 1996, N12, pp.79-81.) By the middle of the 2000s when problems of a new round of reform of federal and regional electoral systems were the centre of attention on the one hand, and a reduction of electoral competition on the other hand, the nature of discussions has changed dramatically. Firstly, the participants today are acting for the most part in the academic field without claiming to be included into political process. 7 (Note7: Exceptions are political technologists serving ruling groups, but their activity is not the subject of this analysis.) Secondly, „the confusion of Babylon“ on the part of the authors who often spoke different scientific languages, is being replaced by a more or less uniform terminological system accepted by a large number of experts, even though this process is still far from its completion. Thirdly, Russian experts are not only arming themselves with different theoretical schemes that proved a success during electoral research work in other countries, reaching from the conception of social divisions of S. Lipset and S. Rokkan 8 (Note8: See Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives / S.M.Lipset, S.Rokkan (eds.). New York: Free Press, 1967. For the analysis of conception evolution and its review of electoral research in post-Communist countries see: Politicheskaya nauka 2004, N4 (special edition under the editorship of E. Meleshkina, А. Kulik).) to the spatial theory of voting, 9 (Note9: For a theoretical review see: Akhremenko А. Prostranstvennoe modelirovanie elektoral’nogo vybora: razvitie, sovremennye problemy i perspektivy // Polis, 2007, N1, pp.153-167, N2, pp.165-179; for the empiric analysis see Popova Е. Problemnye izmereniya elektoral’noy politiki: gubernatorskie vybory v sravnitel’noy perspektive // Polis, 2001, N3, pp.47-62.) but they are also developing their own original theoretical constructions on this basis. Fourthly, comparative studies of Russian elections are becoming popular in Russia both based on comparison of national electoral cycles, 10 (Note10: See Rossiya v izbiratel’nom tsikle 1999-2000 godov / under the editorship of M. Makfol, N. Petrov, N. Ryabov. М.: Gendal’f, 2000; Rossiya v izbiratel’nom tsikle 1999-2000 godov; Pervyy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, 1993-1996 / under the editorship of V. Gel’man, G. Golosov, Е. Meleshkina. М.: Ves’ mir, 2000; Vtoroy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, 1999-2000 / under the editorship of V. Gel’man, G. Golosov, E. Meleshkina. М.: Ves’ mir, 2002; Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, 2003-2004 gody / under the editorship of V. Gel’man. SPb: Izdatel’stvo Evropeyskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2007.) and based on comparison of different aspects of elections in the Russian regions. 11 (Note11: See in particular: Golosov G. Rossiyskaya partiynaya sistema i regional’naya politika, 1993-2003. SPb: Izdatel’stvo Evropeyskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2006; Kynev А. Politicheskie partii v rossiyskikh regionakh: vzglyad cherez prizmu regional’noy izbiratel’noy reformy // Polis, 2006, N6, pp.145-160; Turovskiy R. Regional’nye vybory v Rossii: sluchay atipichnoy demokratii http://www.electoralgeography.com/ru/articles/turovsky/2006/regional-elections-in-russia.html , и др.) Fifthly, the methods based on the interpretation of descriptive statistics in electoral research are increasingly being replaced by modern methods of regression and factorial analysis which are practised on a wide scale for electoral research in international political science. The six and final point: whereas in the middle of the 1990s there was a very active discussion among Russian researchers on the role of elections in the democratisation process of the country, by the middle of the 2000s a sad consensus was stated in the Russian scientific community viz. hardly any of the native political scientists are inclined to believe that Russian elections nowadays comply with democratic standards. 12 (Note12: See, for example, Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii (zaochnyy kruglyy stol) // Polis, 2004, N1, pp.6-73.)
[4] As one can see, this trend differs dramatically from the dynamics of many other movements of Russian political science as well as of the social sciences as a whole. The reason for these differences is only partly hidden in the specific character of the study subject under discussion. Russian electoral research experts confronted with the abundance of factual data of the election results could not but ask themselves the question “why?” and search for empirically verified answers (Russian political scientists studying political culture do not for the most part even ask the question “why?”). However, considerable influence was exerted by the evolution of the electoral institution itself: the development of instruments of political competition in the 1990s not only attracted broad public attention, but also conditioned the development of electoral research itself. To a certain extent they became as well as the elections themselves, a product of the democratisation process which also affected the institutionalisation of the subject field. Researchers working in different scientific disciplines (from mathematics to geography) who were for the most part free from the “heritage” of Soviet social science and not tied up by the institutional organisation of the earlier established scientific and educational institutions, 13 (Note13: Moreover, the most prominent Russian scientific centres for research of different electoral aspects (from the Levada-Centre to the Carnegie Moscow Centre) were also founded in the post-Soviet era.) found themselves involved in this process. In other words, the „field“ of electoral research in the 1990s in Russia started from nothing and - as distinct from the fully developed branches of social knowledge 14 (Note14: See Bourdieu P. Homo Academicus. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.) - was not under pressure on the part of the academic environment (which was already highly fragmented). This circumstance, among other issues, made it easier for many experts to orientate themselves towards the international scientific standards and some became integrated into different research networks.
[5] What have Russian political scientists achieved in the field of electoral research during the last decade? It is hardly possible to answer this question because of the vast number of publications on this topic which are difficult to analyse. 15 (Note15: Detailed bibliography published in 2002 contains 3456 sources in Russian on different electoral aspects, including 1496 papers on elections in 1993-2000. See Vedeneev Yu., I. Zaytsev, V. Lugovoy. Institut vyborov v Rossii (istoriya i sovremennost’). Bibliographical index http://www.democracy.ru/library/bibliodict/biblio/index.html ) Therefore only a few trends that appear most significant and can influence the development of Russian electoral research in the long term should be emphasised, without claiming to cover all topics and directions without exception. Among them are in particular:
[6] (1) Successful institutionalisation of electoral research as an integral part of Russian political science, which shows through inclusion of corresponding training courses into national educational standards, publications of educational books 16 (Note16: See Vybory i partii v regionakh Rossii / under the editorship of G. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva, S. Ryzhenkov. М-SPb: Letniy sad, 2000; Golosov G., Е. Meleshkina. Politicheskie partii i vybory. SPb: Borey-print, 2001; Skripkina Zh. Izbiratel’nye sistemy i technologii. М: Infra-М, 2006, and many other publications.) and reading books 17 (Note17: See Partii i vybory. Reading book, part 1 / under the editorship of N. Anokhina, E. Meleshkina. М.: INION RAN, 2004; Partii i vybory. Reading book, part 2 / under the editorship of G. Andreeva, N. Anokhina, E. Meleshkina. М.: INION RAN, 2004.), holding of a number of conferences, 18 (Note18: See in particular: Elektoral’naya politologiya: teoriya i opyt Rossii / under the editorship of L. Smorgunov. SPb: Izdatel’stvo SPbGU, 1998; Vybory v Rossiyskoy Federatsii / under the editorship of М. Gornyy. SPb: Norma, 2002; Rossiyskie vybory v kontekste mezhdunarodnykh standartov / under the editorship of А. Ivanchenko, А. Lyubarev. М.: Aspekt-press, 2006, and many other publications.) editing of magazines, 19 (Note19: Besides the periodical «Vestnik Tsentral’noy izbiratel’noy komissii Rossiyskoy Federatsii», there is a magazine edited by the Central Election Commission «Zhurnal o vyborakh» and the magazine «Vybory. Zakonodatel’stvo i tekhnologii» http://www.vibory.ru/journal.htm and others.) websites 20 (Note20: See in particular: www.democracy.ru ; http://izbiratel.ru/ and many other websites) and blogs 21 (Note21: See in particular the blogs: http://g-golosov.livejournal.com/ http://alexander-kynev.livejournal.com/ and others. ) on electoral problems that contribute to the institutionalisation of the scientific community in this realm;
[7] (2) Development of the information base of electoral research – emergence of electoral statistics available for further analysis and presented in official publications and electronic resources of the Central Election Commission 22 (Note22: See the website of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation www.cikrf.ru and its numerous publications.) and regional election commissions as well as specially prepared statistics by individual experts and research centres. In particular, one should mention the Independent Institute of Elections, 23 (Note23: See www.vibory.ru ) the website “Electoral geography” 24 (Note24: See www.electoralgeography.com ) and the IRENA project of the European University in Saint Petersburg. 25 (Note25: See http://www.eu.spb.ru/irena/index.htm ) The emergence of the first archive of sociological data with the records of mass surveys 26 (Note26: See http://sofist.socpol.ru/ ) also belongs to this.
[8] (3) Publication of a number of collective monographs and collections of scientific papers devoted to comprehensive researches of elections not only at the national level but also in the individual regions of Russia. 27 (Note27: See in particular: Vybory organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti Ryazanskoy oblasti: sravnitel’nyy politicheskiy analiz / under the editorship of V. Avdonin. Ryasan’: RGPU, 2002.) The thematic “menu” of these works includes, as a rule, studying three key components of electoral policy:
[9] strategies of political parties and candidates in the electoral process (or, in politico-economic language, analysis of “supply” in the electoral market);behaviour of voters during elections (analysis of “demand” in the electoral market);the role of political institutions in the electoral process.
[10] In this context one can speak about a certain rapprochement of the research focus of Russian scientific work to the problem agenda of electoral research carried out abroad;
[11] (4) Initial entrance to the international market of scientific work of some Russian political scientists studying elections and as a result publication of a number of articles 28 (Note28: See in particular: Golosov G. Electoral Systems and Party Formation in Russia: A Cross-Regional Analysis // Comparative Political Studies, 2003, vol.36, N8, P.912-936; Kolosov V., D.Vizgalov, N.Borodulina. Voting Behaviour in Russian Cities, 1995-2000 // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 2003, vol.19, N3, P.25-40; McFaul M., N.Petrov. What the Elections Tell Us // Journal of Democracy, 2004, vol.15, N3, P.20-31; Gel’man V. Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species? // Post-Soviet Affairs, 2005, vol.21, N3, P.226-246; Likhtenchtein A., N.Yargomskaya Duverger’s Equilibrium under Limited Competition: Russia’s Parliamentary Elections // Europe-Asia Studies, 2005, vol.57, N8, P.1169-1188, and many other publications.) and books 29 (Note29: See Elections in Russia, 1993-1996: Analyses, Documents, and Data / V.Gel’man, G.Golosov (eds.). Berlin: edition Sigma, 1999; The 1999-2000 National Elections in Russia: Analyses, Documents, and Data / V.Gel’man, G.Golosov, E.Meleshkina (eds.). Berlin: edition Sigma, 2005; McFaul M., N.Petrov, A.Ryabov. Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004; Golosov G. Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.) on this topic in English. Some of them are written as state of the art international political science and several publications are recognised among experts. 30 (Note30: E.g. works of G.Golosov were awarded with the Prize of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the American Library Association (Choice magazine); this is one of a few significant achievements of Russian political scientists at the international level.)
[12] But what are the informative achievements of Russian electoral research granting that we exclude a simple introduction of new facts into the scientific world and their interpretation? In other words, what new information have Russian researchers learned about the elections themselves and about politics in Russia and in the world? To be able to answer this question we will examine more closely (without aiming an entire review) some works devoted to the research of the individual components of electoral policy as mentioned above.
[13] The analysis of strategies of the parties 31 (Note31: „parties“ here and below are any electoral associations and blocks.) and candidates in the Russian electoral market 32 (Note32: For a review of political market studies see Pshizova S. Demokratiya i politicheskiy rynok v sravnitel’noy perspektive // Polis, 2000, N2, pp.30-44, N3, pp.6-17.) carries an inference about a fundamental difference between the period of the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s, when the market was characterised by an excess supply, and the period of time after 2003/2004 which is marked by a tendency of monopolisation on the part of the United Russia party. 33 (Note33: See Makarenko B. Parlamentskie vybory 2003 g. kak proyavlenie krizisa partiynoy sistemy // Polis, 2004, N1, pp.51-65; Gel’man V. Ot «besformennogo plyuralizma» – k «dominiruyushchey vlasti»? Transformatsiya rossiyskoy partiynoy sistemy // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 2006, N1, pp.46-58.) Proliferation was marked by the short-term „survival“ of the parties in the first stage of the development of the party system. Not many participants in the elections could keep their organisational succession from one electoral cycle to another. 34 (Note34: For a comparative analysis see Golosov G. Partiynye sistemy Rossii i stran Vostochnoy Evropy. М.: Ves’ mir, 1999.) Unlike the party systems of many “new democracies”, the specifics of the Russian electoral market of the 1990s was characterised by confrontation between the parties and the competitors on the part of the alternative providers of political benefits: “surrogate parties”. 35 (Note35: See Golosov G. Gubernatory i partiynaya politika // Pro et Contra, 2000, vol.5, N1, pp.92-102; Hale H. Why Not Parties in Russia: Federalism, Democracy, and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.) The candidates regarded the ideological capital of the parties as insufficient to invest their political careers into. More profit was promised by the administrative capital and was accumulated by two influential players in the electoral market: regional “political machines” which were under the control of governors, and Russian financial-industrial groups under the leadership of “oligarchs”. It is therefore no wonder that strong candidates in the elections at all levels were successful as independent candidates without committing themselves to one party or another and obtaining support of governors or “oligarchs”. 36 (Note36: See Golosov G., Yu. Shevchenko. Faktory elektoral’nogo uspekha v odnomandatnykh okrugakh // Pervyy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.130-151.) Even the election of half the deputies of the State Duma from the party lists did not change the situation: party leaders lost blocking share holdings of their own parties and were in fact selling seats in their lists to the representatives of business and regional elites. 37 (Note37: See Barsukova S., V. Zvyagintsev. Mekhanizm «politicheskogo investirovaniya», ili kak i zachem rossiyskiy biznes uchastvuet v vyborakh i oplachivaet partiynuyu zhizn’ // Polis, 2006, N2, pp.110-121.) This led to a fragmentation of the electoral market, and the Kremlin as the owner of the main administrative capital in the country “operated for a fall” of the political market as a whole, acting according to the principle “divide and rule”. It was also the regional atomism that hindered consolidation of the political market. Although governors participated in establishing a “ruling party”, they aimed to increase their share in the profit of this party and not to strengthen its position in the political market. 38 (Note38: See Likhtenshteyn А. «Partii vlasti»: elektoral’nye strategii rossiyskikh elit // Vtoroy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.85-106.) As for the Kremlin, it was cheaper for it to invest capital into new „ruling parties“ than to market the existing ones.
[14] The investments of the 2000s into the „ruling party“ brought a maximum of dividends for the Kremlin. Due to the hostile takeover of their competitors the United Russia party was established. Under the pressure from the Kremlin, it has become the owner of blocking holdings of the regional “political machines”. United Russia succeeded in capitalisation of its main assets - namely the mass voters’ support of V. Putin – and in converting its administrative capital into victory in the Duma election of 2003 resulting in absolute domination in parliament. Moreover, barriers to entry were imposed on the electoral market. 39 (Note39: After 2003 the entry requirements for the State Duma and most regional legislatures was raised to 7%, the necessary membership of the new parties to be registered raised to 50,000 members; foundation of pre-electoral coalitions was forbidden.) The share in the profits of the „ruling party“ derived from the regional leaders at federal level decreased dramatically after the abolition of gubernatorial elections and the reforming of the electoral systems in the different regions. As a result, not only “surrogate parties” but also the competitive parties owning ideological capital, found themselves expelled from the electoral market or in an extremely marginal niche.
[15] Unlike the discussions of the 1990s, in the 2000s, Russian researchers share opinions about a four-section ideological classification of Russian parties: the Left (Communist Party of the Russian Federation and their allies), the Liberals (Union of Right Forces, “Yabloko” and others), the Nationalists (from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia to “Rodina”) and the “ruling parties” (United Russia and its satellites). 40 (Note40: See in particular: Golosov G. Politicheskie partii i nezavisimye kandidaty na dumskikh vyborakh // Vtoroy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.43-64; Sheynis V. Tretiy raund (k itogam parlamentskikh i presidentskikh vyborov) // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2000, N9, pp.45-61.) At the same time, other grounds for the classification of the parties (government vs. opposition or program parties vs. clientelistic parties) 41 (Note41: See Kitschelt H. et al. Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.) turned out to be insufficient for an analysis of the Russian party system or required fundamental modification. 42 (Note42: See in particular: Gel’man V. Politicheskaya oppozitsiya v Rossii: vymirayushchiy vid? // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, С.59-90.) Additionally, the evolution of the parties’ programs and candidates themselves required rethinking. Whilst, for example, the positions of the parties came closer on key problems and approached the point of a “median voter” from election to election according to A. Downs, 43 (Note43: See Downs A. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.) the positions of the candidates in the presidential elections, on the contrary, demonstrated an increase in differences. 44 (Note44: See Popova Е. Programmnye strategii i modeli elektoral’nogo sorevnovaniya na dumskikh i presidentskikh vyborakh 1995-2004 godov // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.156-195; an alternative approach is presented in: Kaspe S., А. Salmin. Izmereniya svobody: parlamentskiy elektoral’nyy protsess v sovremennoy Rossii // Politiya, 2000, N3, pp.5-54.) A decrease in the importance of ideology as an electoral resource of parties and candidates was also observed in the 2000s in comparison with the 1990s which were characterised by a high level of political uncertainty, although some authors emphasised the essential role of ideological preferences in the electoral behaviour of the Russians. 45 (Note45: See Alekseev F. and others. Polyarizovannost’ elektoral’nykh predpochteniy v Rossii (Opyt vyborov v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu RF v 1993-2003 gg.) // Politiya, 2004, N2, pp.5-26.)
[16] Researchers noted that the constellation of institutional and political factors exerted a key influence on the strategies of the parties and candidates in the parliamentary and presidential elections. In particular, the combination of the presidential-parliamentary system of government and the mixed electoral system, even though it helped the parties to achieve the role of the key players of electoral and parliamentary policy, restricted their influence to the State Duma. 46 (Note46: See Klyamkin I. Postsovetskaya politicheskaya sistema v Rossii (vozniknovenie, evolutsiya i perspektivy transformatsii) http://www.sovetpamfilova.ru/text/1254/?parent=53 ) In addition, the electoral schedule that prescribed that parliamentary elections go before the presidential ones induced the ruling elites to establish “ruling parties” but at the same time provided negative incentives for a coalitional policy of the parties 47 (Note47: See Likhtensteyn A. “Partii vlasti”.) (whose success did not depend on electoral strategy). 48 (Note48: Shcherbak А. Koalitsionnaya politika rossiyskikh partiy // Vtoroy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.107-132.) Under these circumstances the nomination of the lists and candidates was characterised by chaos and party loyalty was by far, not the most important electoral resource in comparison, for example, with incumbency. 49 (Note49: See in particular: Golosov G. Politicheskie partii i nezavisimye kandidaty; Shevchenko Yu. Institutsionalizatsiya Gosudarstvennoy Dumy i uchastie deputatov tret’ego sozyva v parlamentskikh vyborakh 2003 goda // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.129-155.) The consolidation of the Russian elites in the 2000s implemented according to the principle of an “enforced consensus” changed the incentives in the electoral policy in the Duma elections. In particular, there was a high level of system-wide fragmentation, voting carried out against all the lists, weakness of the oppositional parties and latent coalitional strategies of United Russia in the elections of 2003, enabled this party to form a “fabricated majority” in the State Duma which has no counterpart in the world on an overrepresentational level. 50 (Note50: See Golosov G. Sfabrikovannoe bol’shinstvo: konversiya golosov v mesta na dumskikh vyborakh 2003 g. // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.39-58.)
[17] Russian researchers took stock of the regional dimension of the electoral policy in Russia. In the 1990s researchers registered, on the one hand, the development of political competition during the elections of the heads of executive authorities in the regions and heads of local self-government, 51 (Note51: See Petrov N., А. Titkov. Vybory glav ispolnitel’noy vlasti regionov // Vybory i partii v regionakh Rossii, pp.52-84.) although this process proceeded with extreme irregularity in some regions of the country depending on the constellation of the regional political elites. 52 (Note52: See in particular: Rossiya regionov: transformatsiya politicheskikh rezhimov / under the editorship of V. Gel’man, S. Ryzhenkov, M. Bri. М.: Ves’ mir, 2000.) The intrusion of the representatives of the big Russian businesses 53 (Note53: See Zubarevich N. Prishel, uvidel, pobedil? Krupnyy bisnes i regional’naya vlast’ // Pro et Contra, 2002, vol.7, N1, pp.107-120.) into the regional electoral markets in the 2000s provided an additional incentive for the competitive struggle in regional policy. 54 (Note54: See Turovskiy R. Politika v regionakh: gubernatory i gruppy vliyaniya. М.: Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologiy, 2002.) However, these processes were (deliberately) interrupted after the abolition of the election of the executive heads of authority in the regions in 2004. On the other hand, a common factor of analysis of the elections was the constellation of the weaknesses of political parties in the regions, the breaking of bonds between the central authority and local activists, 55 (Note55: See in particular: Afanas’ev М. Politicheskie partii na regional’nom urovne // Pro et Contra, 2000, vol.5, N4, pp.164-183.) and their minor influence on the regional political process. Some hopes to reform regional electoral systems which were expressed in this context in the beginning of the 2000s 56 (Note56: See Golosov G. Izmereniya rossiyskikh regional’nykh izbiratel’nykh system // Polis, 2001, N4, pp.71-85; Glubotskiy А., А. Kynev. Opyt smeshannykh vyborov v rossiyskikh regionakh // Polis, 2003, N2, pp.124-142.) were not fulfilled as expected. 57 (Note57: See Kynev А. Perekhod k smeshannym vyboram v regionakh: «prinuditel’naya transformatsiya». Polis, 2004, N2, pp.32-40; Makarkin А. Smeshannaya sistema vyborov v regionakh Rossii // Pro et Contra, 2006, vol.10, N1, pp.104-113.) According to the analysis of regional elections carried out by P. Panov, authoritarian regions became even more authoritarian and competitive ones even more competitive. 58 (Note58: Panov P. Reforma regional’nykh izbiratel’nykh sistem i razvitie politicheskikh partiy v regionakh Rossii (krossregional’nyy sravnitel’nyy analiz) // Polis, 2005, N6, pp.102-117.) In the course of his comparative study of the regional electoral processes, prove was gained that United Russia became a key player in the elections and legislatures in the greater majority of Russian regions against the background of maintaining the main cross-regional differences. 59 (Note59: See Panov P. Regional’nye politicheskie protsessy v „epokhu Putina“: unifikatsiya ili diversifikatsiya? // Politeks, 2006, vol.2, N4, pp.109-134 http://politex.info/content/view/273/40/ ) In any case, the observed decrease in electoral competition at both federal and regional level speaks about strengthening of the domination of the “ruling party”, although the prospects of establishment of a party system in Russia with one dominating party are assessed ambiguously. 60 (Note60: See Gelman V. Perspektivy dominiruyushchey partii v Rossii // Pro et Contra, 2006, vol.10, N4, pp.62-71; Pantin V., V. Lapkin. Politicheskie transformatsii v Rossii i na Ukraine v 2004-2006 gg.: prichiny i vozmozhnye posledstviya // Polis, 2007, N1, pp.104-119.) Time will show how true these (and other) assumptions are.
[18] Although electoral behaviour has been at the centre of attention of researchers since the first competitive elections for the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies of the USSR in 1989, 61 (Note61: See Vesna-89. Geografiya i anatomiya parlamentskikh vyborov / under the editorship of V. Kolosov, N. Petrov, L Smirnyagin. М.: Progress, 1990.) its theoretical recognition has appeared on the agenda of Russian political scientists within the last decade. 62 (Note62: See in particular: Golosov G. Povedenie izbirateley v Rossii: teoreticheskie perspektivy i resul’taty regional’nykh vyborov // Polis, 1997, N4, pp.44-56; Shevchenko Yu. Mezhdu ekspressiey i ratsional’nost’yu: ob izuchenii elektoral’nogo povedeniya v Rossii // Polis, 1998, pp.130-136; Meleshkina Е. Issledovaniya elektoral’nogo povedeniya: teoreticheskie modeli i problemy ikh primeneniya // Politicheskaya nauka, 2001, N2, pp.190-215.) The demand to rethink the reasons for electoral instability that Russia experienced in the 1990s and 2000s 63 (Note63: See in particular: Malyutin М. Elektoral’nye predpochteniya rossiyan: «paradoks stabil’nosti» // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 1998, N1, pp.41-50; Ovchinnikov B. Elektoral’naya evolyutsiya: Prostranstvo regionov i prostranstvo partiy v 1995 i 1999 godakh // Polis, 2000, N2, pp.68-79; Anokhina N., Е. Meleshkina. Itogi golosovaniya i elektoral’noe povedenie // Vtoroy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.158-185.) gave a direct impulse to this theoreticalisation. The limits of using standard frames of rational and expressive theories of electoral behaviour on the one hand, and negativism and absenteeism determined by Russian political context on the other, exited greatest interest. Researchers noted that many explanations of electoral behaviour, that successfully proved themselves, also demonstrated insufficient explanatory power in Russia or required a modification. First of all, it is about the role of social discrepancies 64 (Note64: See in particular: Kalinin K. Sotsietal’nye razmezhevaniya i elektoral’noe povedenie v Rossii (1993-2003 gg.) // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 2006, N5, pp.35-49; Akhremenko А. Sotsial’nye razmezhevaniya i struktury elektoral’nogo prostranstva Rossii // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 2007, N4, pp.80-92, and other works.) and more broadly, the role of social structure in the electoral behaviour of the Russians. The common conclusion of most experts was the affirmation of a relatively moderate influence by most social factors (professional and social status, education, income, gender, age) on the voting of the Russian electorate. The only exceptions were territorial differences that represented an individual case of fundamental modernised contradiction of the Russian centres and peripheries. 65 (Note65: See Turovskiy R. Regional’noe izmerenie elektoral’nogo protsessa (kontseptual’nye osnovy issledovaniy) // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 2006, N5, pp.5-19.) As showed by R. Turovskiy, establishment and strengthening of regional and local electoral “subcultures” 66 (Note66: See Turovskiy R. Regional’nye osobennosti obshcherossiyskikh vyborov // Vtoroy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.186-214; Turovskiy R. Federal’nye vybory 2003-2004 godov v regional’nom izmerenii // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.246-293.) took place during three nation-wide electoral cycles. However, while big centres of the first and second order were a bulwark of loyalty of the federal government in the 1990s, a peculiar inversion happened in the 2000s. There were pockets of anti-governmental voting (in favour of liberal, left or nationalist parties) while the voting in favour of incumbents and the “ruling parties” shifted to the half-periphery and periphery zones. However, these tendencies were not only the consequence of social-economic differentiation of Russian society, but also a result of the influence of the “mediators” between the political parties (candidates) and the voters represented by regional elites.
[19] The effects of this influence made themselves evident by the fact that depending on the position of the regional elites in the national elections, the voting in the corresponding territories could occur more (or less) opportunely for the incumbents and the „ruling parties“. While one part of the country’s territories (first of all ethnic republics of North Caucasus, Tatarstan 67 (Note67: See in particular: Chto khotel by izbiratel’ Tatarstana znat’ o vyborakh (no ne znaet, gde sprosit’) / under the editorship of М. Farukshin, V. Mikhaylov. Kazan’: GranDan, 2002.) and Bashkortostan) was considered by experts as a possible area of mass falsification of election results, researchers also paid attention to the phenomenon of “administrative resource”, 68 (Note68: See in particular: Vorontsova А., V. Zvonovskiy. Administrativnyy resurs kak fenomen rossiyskogo izbiratel’nogo protsessa // Polis, 2003, N6, pp.114-124.) i.e. direct or indirect influence of voters on the part of the elite. To a large extent, they relied on patronising clientelistic networks at a local level. 69 (Note69: See Afanas’ev М. Klientelizm i rossiyskaya gosudarstvennost’. М.: MONF, 1997.) These were formed during the Soviet times and strengthened in the context of the regional authoritarian regimes in many territories. It is likely that these tendencies will continue to strengthen in the subsequent electoral cycles.
[20] In its turn, the influence of regional and local elites on the behaviour of voters and election outcome resulted in distortion of incentives of social-economic policy of the government especially concerning the regions. Its subjects were not so much the voters as the regional elite. The federal government tried to buy the loyalty of the regional elite in accordance with the “transfers in exchange for votes” scheme prior to the elections. However, while in the first half of the 1990s their main goal was “pacification” of leaders with opposing views (first of all in the republics), 70 (Note70: See Treisman D. After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999.) at the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s the distribution of budget transfers took place on the principle of “friendly support”. 71 (Note71: See in particular: Popov V. Byudzhetnyy federalizm v Rossii: rol’ politicheskikh faktorov v formirovanii finansovykh potokov mezhdu tsentrom i regionami, http://www.nes.ru/public-presentations/Papers/Popov-rus.htm.) As shown by A. Shcherbak, the volume of federal transfers was a more significant factor in supporting the “ruling parties“ in Russian regions during the Duma elections of 2003 than the wage increase. 72 (Note72: Shcherbak А. Ekonomicheskiy rost i itogi dumskikh vyborov 2003 goda // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.196-216.) By large, unlike many foreign countries where the voting of the electorate depended largely on the objective economic features (inflation rate, unemployment and others), Russian voters were less sensitive to these factors in the 1990s as well as in the 2000s. More important for the voters, however, was the economic situation in the country and in “their own” regions. 73 (Note73: See in particular, Colton T. Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.) In other words, it was about the determining impact of the “opinion factor” 74 (Note74: See Kalinin K. Fakotry elektoral’nogo sprosa na rossiyskom politicheskom rynke // Polis, 2006, N3, pp.75-90.) on the behaviour of the voters, i.e. adjustments that were shaped under the influence of the information background and then exposed to different kinds of manipulations with ruling elites in the Centre and in the regions as main players. 75 (Note75: Examples of such manipulations are re-electoral campaigns for B. Yeltsin in 1996 and the campaign on election of State Duma deputies in 1999.)
[21] The integration of the elite inside the “ruling party” United Russia that was observed in the 2000s consequently had an intricate influence on the behaviour of the voters. On the one hand, researchers noted the “nationalisation” of voting, i.e. an increase of territorial homogeneity of electoral support of most parties. 76 (Note76: See Likhtensteyn А. Federalizm i partii vlasti v Rossii: territorial’noe raspredelenie elektoral’noy podderzhki // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.217-245.) On the other hand, the reverse of the decrease in electoral competition was a decline in voter turnout and growth of negativism (voting “against all” the candidates and/or parties) both in the federal and especially regional elections. As shown by researchers, negativism in Russia took the form of a specific electoral protest, 77 (Note77: See in particular: Lyubarev А. Golosovanie «protiv vsekh»: motivy i tendentsii // Polis, 2003, N6, pp.104-113; Akhremenko А. Golosovanie «protiv vsekh» v 1995-2003 gg.: rezul’taty empericheskogo issledovaniya //Vestnik MGU, series 12, 2004, N6, pp.60-75.) although it objectively helped to re-distribute the mandates in favour of parties which won the elections in a proportional electoral system (in 2003 it was United Russia). As for absenteeism, a decline in voter turnout in conjunction with social-economic modernisation of Russian regions and an increase in voter turnout in the “controllable” regions with a low level of competition in the elections was proved statistically. 78 (Note78: See Gudina Yu. Aktivnost’ rossiyskikh izbirateley: teoreticheskie modeli i praktika // Polis, 2003, N1, pp.112-123.) In addition, it was found that there was also a not insignificant influence on the electoral behaviour by the mechanism of division of powers that contributed to the transformation of voting in the Duma elections into “elections of the second order”. 79 (Note79: See Shevchenko Yu. Podvodya itogi: rezul’taty rossiyskikh vyborov 1993-1996 gg. // Pervyy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.212-241.)
[22] Speaking about the specifics of the Russian research on electoral behaviour, it should be noted that most significant works in this field were mainly produced on the basis of the analysis of aggregative data of electoral statistics. In particular, one should mention the contribution of the experts into the field of electoral geography analysing with the help of modern analysis methods not only the elections of 1990s-2000s but also the voting in the elections in pre-revolutionary Russia. 80 (Note80: See Titkov А. Partiynaya sistema Rossii nachala ХХ v. v prostranstve problemnykh izmereniy i v geograficheskom prostranstve // Politicheskaya nauka, 2005, N2, pp.135-153.) Unlike foreign studies, however, the analysis of individual data collected during mass surveys is much less widespread in Russia. Although leading Russian sociological centres (Russian Center for Public Opinion Research, Public Opinion Foundation, Levada Center) regularly collect and publish survey results and have accumulated a great array of sociological information in recent years, a great number of scientific texts written by the experts of these centres are of less cognitive value in terms of political science. They are very seldom orientated to the examination of theoretically justified hypotheses and practically never use methods of multidimensional statistical analysis of data restricted to cross-tabulation at best. Their main cognitive means are interpretation of publishing quality 81 (Note81: See, for example: Gudkov L, B. Dubin. Rossiyskie vybory: vremya «serykh» // Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya, 2000, N2, pp.17-29; Levada Ju. Ishchem cheloveka. Sotsiologicheskie ocherki, 2000-2005. М.: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2006, pp.76-90; Sedov L. О chem veshchayut golosa izbirateley // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, 2004, N5, С.65-74, and many other works.) that does not allow for answering the question about the causal regularities of electoral behaviour (as a rule, sociologists do not even ask those questions). 82 (Note82: The analysis of the reasons for situations such as this is beyond the scope of this work.) While Russian experts in conducting surveys earn gratitude on the part of political scientists for collecting valuable information, electoral researchers for the most part can only account for the second analysis of data. In the course of this analysis they try to examine some theoretical schemes to explain electoral behaviour such as “funnel of causality”. 83 (Note83: See Meleshkina E, N. Anokhina. Elektoral’noe povedenie rossiyan kak model’ „voronki prichinnosti“ // Politiya, 2001-2002, N4, pp.25-43; Meleshkina Е. «Voronka prichinnosti» v elektoral’nykh issledovaniyakh // Polis, 2002, N5, pp.47-53.) With formation and expansion of the archives of sociological data the situation is changing for the better: the first efforts of theoretically founded statistical analysis of mass survey data hold promise 84 (Note84: See Kalinin К. Sotsietal’nye razmezhevaniya.) and deserve to be continued. There are grounds for hope that the integration of efforts of researchers, the introduction of theoretical knowledge and modern analysis methods of data will successfully help to comprehend objective laws of electoral behaviour of Russians.
[23] Speaking about research of Russian institutes that set frameworks of an electoral system, one should distinguish between “narrow” and “broad” when using the term “electoral system”. While research on electoral policy in developed democracies concentrates on the “narrow” sense of electoral systems such as formulas for the distribution of seats’ in legislatures, the electoral researchers in Russia (as well as in many other countries) mainly pay attention to the “broad” sense of electoral systems as the whole complex of standards and experiences of the electoral process.
[24] The factors mentioned above do not mean that Russian researchers have not showed interest in analysis of the effects of the electoral system in its “narrow” sense. On the contrary, the mixed disconnected electoral system 85 (Note85: A similar electoral system is currently in the legislature of elections in most Russian regions.) that was in place during the Duma elections of 1993-2003 was subject to a comprehensive analysis. Its focus of attention was not only the geneses and evolution of the Russian electoral system, 86 (Note86: See Ivanchenko А., А. Kynev, А. Lyubarev. Proportsional’naya izbiratel’naya sistema v Rossii: istoriya, sovremennoe sostoyanie, perspektivy. М.: Aspekt-press, 2005.) but also its effects. The researchers emphasised not only the disconnected character of the electoral system (with the consequent proliferation of small parties and independent candidates), but also a mutual influence of both its parts (“contamination effects”, when nomination of party candidates in single mandate constituencies strengthened the position of the party while lists voting). 87 (Note87: See Petrov N. Analiz rezultatov vyborov 1995 g. v Gosudarstennuyu Dumu po okrugam i regionam // Parlamentskie vybory 1995 goda v Rossii / under the editorship of М. Makfol, N. Petrov. М.: Moskovskiy tsentr Karnegi, 1996, pp.7-57; Yargomskaya N. Izbiratel’naya sistema i uroven’ partiynoy fragmentatsii v Rossii // Polis, 1999, N4, pp.122-129.) In addition, the researchers demonstrated the specifics of mechanical and psychological “Duverger’s effects” in the Russian electoral context caused by the form of electoral competition at federal level and in single mandate constituencies. 88 (Note88: See Likhtenshteyn А., N. Yargomskaya. Zakon Dyuverzhe i sistema otnositel’nogo bol’shinstva na dumskikh vyborakh // Politicheskaya nauka, 2003, N1, pp.103-126; Likhtenshteyn А., N. Yargomskaya. Ekvilibrium Dyuverzhe v usloviyakh ogranichennoy konkurentsii // Tretiy elektoral’nyy tsikl v Rossii, pp.91-128.) However, unlike the 1990s when the active participation of Russian political scientists in the reformation of the electoral system 89 (Note89: At that period of time V. Sheynis, G. Satarov, A. Salmin and many other experts played an important role in developing and discussing drafts of normative acts on elections.) was not always accompanied by adequate analytical apprehension of its political consequences, the situation in the 2000s was precisely the opposite. Although experts took stock of the prospects of the new round of reforms of the electoral system at both federal 90 (Note90: See in particular: Anokhina N. Rossiyskaya izbiratel’naya sistema: posledstviya izmeneniy // Politicheskaya nauka, 2005, N2, pp.26-39; Makarenko B. Novyy zakon o vyborakh i evolutsii rezhima // Pro et Contra, 2006, vol.10, N1, pp.95-103; Ivanchenko А., А. Kynev, А. Lyubarev. The title mentioned above.) and regional 91 (Note91: See Kynev А. Perekhod k smeshannym vyboram v regionakh.) level, they did not have a significant influence on the decision making processes. Against the background of the decline in electoral competition in Russia a decrease in demand for expertise of political scientists on the part of politicians took place.
[25] The analysis of the effects of the Russian electoral system in the “broad” sense of this term included uncovering the influence of factors such as the mechanisms of political financing, 92 (Note92: See in particular: Barsukova S., V. Zvyagintsev. The title mentioned above.) coverage of election campaigns in mass media 93 (Note93: See Zadorin I. Sredstva massovoy informatsii i elektoral’noe povedenie rossiyan // Rossiya v izbiratel’nom tsikle 1999-2000 godov, pp.208-221.) and adjudication of electoral issues. The overall conclusion was the statement that these factors significantly influenced election results because of a disruption to electoral competition and distortion of voters’ preferences. 94 (Note94: See Gel’man V. Institutsional’noe stroitel’stvo i neformal’nye instituty v sovremennoy rossiyskoy politike // Polis, 2003, N4. pp.6-25.) A number of provisions to Russian electoral laws and their practice especially in the 2000s appeared as “disruptive” informal institutes that were responsible for the unjust character of the electoral process (which is not Russian specific in character). 95 (Note95: See Electoral Authoritarianism / A.Schedler (ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.) While at the beginning of the 2000s “soft” methods of restricting electoral competition (linked to the systematically unjust character of the electoral campaign) were practised in Russia, on the threshold of the elections of 2007/2008 “hard” restrictions linked to the systematic exclusion of parties and candidates from the electoral process became more and more obvious.
[26] It is therefore no wonder that Russian political scientists were, to a great extent, forced to use systematic quality analysis of the electoral process in Russia. From registration and classification of a number of abuses (like mass exclusion of unwanted candidates from the elections – so-called “Bashkir election technology”) 96 (Note96: See Pribylovskiy V. Triumfal’noe shestvie bashkirskoy izbiratel’noy tekhnologii // Rossiya Putina: pristrastnyy vzglyad / under the editorship of А. Verkhovskiy, Е. Mikhaylovskaya, V. Pribylovskiy. М.: Panorama, 2003, pp.159-172; Pribylovskiy V. Upravlyaemye vybory: degradatsiya vyborov pri Putine // Rossiya Putina: istoriya bolezni / under the editorship of G. Belonuchkin. М.: Panorama, 2004, pp.6-85.) researchers switched to the monitoring of electoral campaigns 97 (Note97: See in particular: Internet-monitoring vyborov v Rossii. Analiticheskiy doklad po rezul’tatam Proekta / under the editorship of G. Satarov. М.: MIPO REPRO, 2001; See also documents on the websites: www.indem.ru www.golos.org www.vibory.ru and others.) in cooperation with non-profit organisations and later on to the development of criteria and methods of quantitative assessment at democratisation level of the electoral process. 98 (Note98: See The democracy level of Russian elections: evaluation criteria (materials of a seminar) http://www.liberal.ru/sitan.asp?Rel=191) In all likelihood, the upcoming electoral cycle of 2007/2008 will give answers to a number of questions about the prospects of the Russian electoral system in both “narrow” and “broad” senses which in turn depend on the prospects of the further transformation of the Russian political regime.
[27] Summing up, one may affirm that the Russian electoral research today demonstrates double tendencies. In academic terms, it is developing quite successfully. Without claiming theoretically ambitious but fruitless projects in cognitive terms of „scientific revolutions“ in the spirit of “home-bred theories”, Russian political scientists working in this field of research structured it according to the drawings of the West “normal science”, 99 (Note99: See Kun T. Struktura nauchnykh revolyutsiy. М.: Progress, 1977.) but using it for domestic “construction material”. The consequence of this approach was the studying of electoral processes in Russia as a policy in a “normal country”, which has not complied with democratic standards, but evolved towards them as a kind of standard ideal. 100 (Note100: For details on the theory of a „normal country“ see Shleyfer А., D. Treyzman. Rossiya – normal’naya strana http://www.politnauka.org/library/russia/shleyfer-treyzman2.php) Theoretical schemes and analysis methods developed on the basis of democracies (both developed and “new” ones) set orientation framework for research. The researchers do not accept the specifics of Russian elections as prescription “in good faith” but identify it in a theoretical and comparative perspective. It cannot go unnoticed, of course, that Russian electoral research has also experienced serious problems. It is partly of a general nature in Russian political science (small circle of experts, minimal influx of qualified personnel, lack of financing for research, poor connections inside the scientific community in Russia and abroad, etc.). Some “growth problems” are typical of the field of electoral research (discrepancy between theoretical knowledge and empiric analysis, insufficient cognitive value of many works based on the material of mass surveys, restricted usage of modern methods of statistical data analysis by experts, lack of comparative cross-national electoral research, 101 (Note101: At the same time, cross-regional comparative studies (electoral as well) are developing rather dynamically in Russia.) etc.). Today one can only hope that future generations will overcome these problems.
[28] However, the most significant problems of Russian electoral research lie not so much in the academic as in the political context. The decline in electoral competition in Russia during the 2000s and the reduction of the field of electoral policy (in particular, abolition of general elections of the heads of executive authority in the regions), challenges not only the Russian policy but also political science doubting the cognitive prospects of further electoral research if not the possibility itself to conduct it. Studying elections as the most important (although, of course, not the only) institution of democracy is very closely connected with its democratic potential: if political scientists were forced to analyse obviously unfree and unfair “elections without choice”, then one should not expect that they take a new angle in science about principles of policy in the country and in the world as a whole. On the contrary, if new trends of electoral competition occur in Russia in the future, this could provide an impetus to the further development of electoral research as well. Political science in Russia as a whole and electoral research in particular, has a chance to become “normal science” only on condition that the policy in Russia does not lose its general attributes of a “normal country” including competitive elections.
written 2007
